Diminished Value After a Car Accident: What Each State Allows
Your car was repaired properly and it is still worth less than it was the morning before the crash. That gap is a claim in most of the country — against the right insurer. Against the wrong one it is worth nothing, and which is which depends entirely on the state you are in.
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Reviewed by Leonard Goldberg, Editor · Last updated
Two Claims That Sound Identical and Go Opposite Ways
Everything turns on whose insurer you are asking. If another driver hit you, you are making a third-party claim — an ordinary tort claim for the damage they did, and 37 of the 51 jurisdictions in the table below recognise it. If you are claiming on your own collision coverage, you are making a first-party claim, and that is a contract question: what does the policy actually promise? In 17 states, the courts have answered that it promises repair or replacement and nothing more.
Florida decided both, and decided them differently. In McHale v. Farm Bureau the court held that repair costs alone are not the limit where the repairs did not restore the property. Twenty years later, in Siegle v. Progressive, the Florida Supreme Court read the standard "repair or replace with other of like kind and quality" policy wording and held it unambiguous: once the insurer has completed a first-rate repair, it owes no diminished value on top. Same loss, same car, two different answers depending on who you send the bill to.
Georgia went the other way on first-party — and it mattered enormously. State Farm v. Mabry (Ga. 2001) held that first-party physical-damage coverage does include diminution in value, and that the insurer must evaluate every claim for it even when the insured never asks. Only 6 states allow the first-party claim at all; Georgia, Kansas and Washington are the clearest of them.
Case Details
Every entry comes from the controlling decision, the statute, or the state insurance department's own bulletin; 50 of the rows carry a citation you can check. Appraisal companies and diminished-value recovery services were excluded from the sources on purpose — they dominate this subject online and every one of them is selling the service the page describes. Where no on-point appellate decision exists, the row says so instead of borrowing a neighbouring state's rule.
Where the Law Is Genuinely Open
New York is the instructive one. Franklin Corp. v. Prahler (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2011) does allow post-repair diminished value — but expressly for a narrow category of unique or appreciating property. For an ordinary depreciating car that precedent reads unfavourably, so we do not record New York as a yes. Minnesota is open for a different reason: its no-fault threshold restricts bodily-injury claims only, so a vehicle property-damage claim proceeds as an ordinary negligence action — but no appellate decision squarely settles the diminished-value measure.
We would rather tell you a state is unresolved than round it to a yes you cannot rely on.
Four Things That Decide Whether the Claim Is Worth Filing
You generally cannot claim it if you were at fault. The third-party claim exists because someone else damaged your property. If the crash was yours, you are left with the first-party route — which 17 states have closed.
The clock runs from the crash, not from the denial. This is the number that goes stale on its own. The deadline to sue ranges from 2 to 10 years across the table, and 17 states give you two years or less. People routinely spend a year negotiating with an adjuster and discover the limitation period ran while they were being polite.
The loss has to be provable, not felt. A diminished-value claim is normally supported by an appraisal comparing the pre-loss market value with the value of the same vehicle carrying a reported accident on its history. Newer cars, low mileage and structural repairs produce the largest gaps; an older high-mileage car with cosmetic damage often shows almost none.
Insurer formulas are not the law. The widely used 17c formula caps the loss at 10 % of book value and then discounts it for mileage and damage severity. It is an internal claims-handling convention, not a legal measure of damages — the measure in most of these states is the difference in market value before and after.
State-by-State: Who Owes Diminished Value
37 of 51 jurisdictions recognize a diminished value claim against the insurer of the driver who hit you.
| State | Third-party claim | Deadline to sue |
|---|---|---|
| Alaska | Unsettled no Alaska appellate decision addresses whether a third-party tortfeasor (or their liability insurer) must pay diminished value for a vehicle after fully adequate repair | 2 yearsAS 09.10.070(a)(3) |
| Alabama | Recognized Robbins v. Voigt, 280 Ala. 207, 191 So. 2d 212 (1966) (negligent collision; measure of damages is depreciation in market value); Coffee County Comm'n v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. 1985); King Motor Co. v. Wilson, 612 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. 1992); all collected and restated in Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 788-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), cert. denied (Ala. May 17, 2002) | 2 yearsAla. Code § 6-2-38(l) |
| Arkansas | Recognized Higgins v. Elliott's Feed, Seed & Fertilizer Co., 248 Ark. 450, 451 S.W.2d 884 (1970) (Ark. Sup. Ct., negligent-collision tort claim) | 3 yearsArk. Code § 16-56-105 |
| Arizona | Recognized Anderson v. Alabam Freight Lines, 64 Ariz. 313, 169 P.2d 865 (1946) (Ariz. Sup. Ct.); Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. v. R.B.L. Inv. Co., 138 Ariz. 562, 675 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Max of Switzerland, Inc. v. Allright Corp., 1997 WL (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) 895 P.2d ... (confirming R.B.L. rule); Oliver v. Henry, 227 Ariz. 514 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (DV recoverable even after full repair, without need to sell the vehicle) | 2 yearsA.R.S. § 12-542 |
| California | Recognized Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594, 600, 170 P.2d 923 (1946) (Cal. Sup. Ct.); codified in Judicial Council jury instruction CACI No. 3903J; rooted in Cal. Civ. Code § 3333 (general tort-damages statute) | 3 yearsCal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(c) |
| Colorado | Recognized Trujillo v. Wilson, 117 Colo. 430, 189 P.2d 147 (1948) (Colo. Sup. Ct., car-accident tort claim); Airborne, Inc. v. Denver Air Center, Inc., 832 P.2d 1086 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (diminution in value recoverable IN ADDITION to repair costs) | 3 yearsC.R.S. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) |
| Connecticut | Recognized Littlejohn v. Elionsky, 130 Conn. 541, 36 A.2d 52 (1944) (Conn. Sup. Ct.): measure of damages for a damaged-but-repairable vehicle is pre-accident market value minus post-accident market value; the court expressly noted a vehicle 'may be badly damaged and be repaired so as to put it in a sound or good state, yet be worth much less than before the accident' (per CT General Assembly's own summary, citing Littlejohn at 553). Reaffirmed in Damico v. Dalton, 469 A.2d 795, 1 Conn. App. 186 (1984) ('the measure of damages... was the difference between its value immediately prior to the collision and its value immediately after'), and again by the Connecticut Appellate Court on May 12, 2026 in a duty-to-defend case confirming DV is a compensable third-party property-damage claim under a standard CT auto liability policy. | 2 yearsConn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584 |
| District of Columbia | Recognized Am. Serv. Ctr. Assocs. v. Helton, 867 A.2d 235, 243 (D.C. 2005) (D.C. Court of Appeals, the District's highest local court): 'when a plaintiff can prove that the value of an injured chattel after repair is less than the chattel's worth before the injury, recovery may be had for both the reasonable cost of repair and the residual diminution in value after repair, provided that the award does not exceed the gross diminution in value.' | 3 yearsD.C. Code § 12-301(a)(3) |
| Delaware | Unsettled General Delaware rule for a damaged (not totally destroyed) vehicle is pre-accident value minus post-accident value: Teitsworth v. Kempski, 127 A.2d 237, 240 (Del. 1956) (Del. Sup. Ct.); Adams v. Hazel, 102 A.2d 919 (Del. Super. 1954); Alber v. Wise, 166 A.2d 141 (Del. 1960). Teitsworth cites Littlejohn v. Elionsky approvingly, as dicta, for the proposition that a vehicle 'might even after it had been repaired have been worth much less than before the collision'; but no reported Delaware case actually presents (and squarely holds on) the fact pattern of a competently repaired vehicle retaining residual diminished value. An independent 2022 Boston University Law Review 50-state survey likewise places Delaware among 16 states with 'no clear leading case or statute' on recovery of diminution in value for repaired chattels. | 2 years10 Del. C. § 8107 |
| Florida | Recognized McHale v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 409 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982): 'damages are not limited to the cost of repairs actually made where plaintiff shows that the repairs did not put the property in as good a condition as it was before the injury. In such cases, the cost of the repairs made plus the diminution in value will ordinarily be the proper measure of damages...' | 2 yearsFla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(a), as amended by ch. 2023-15, Laws of Fla. (HB 837, eff. Mar. 24, 2023) |
| Georgia | Recognized Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 127 S.E.2d 454 (1962), and Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cumbie, 130 Ga. App. 419, 203 S.E.2d 558 (1973) (Ga. Ct. App., full text verified): measure of damages for a vehicle the insurer elects to repair is the difference in value before the collision and after the repairs are made, less any deductible. Also see Perma Ad Ideas, Inc. v. Mayville, 158 Ga. App. 707, 282 S.E.2d 128 (1981), cited by industry sources for the same third-party diminution-in-value rule. | 4 yearsO.C.G.A. § 9-3-32 |
| Hawaii | Unsettled Richards v. Kailua Auto Mach. Serv., 880 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994): the general 'depreciation rule' (difference between pre- and post-damage value) is the traditional starting point for injury to personal property, but the court EXPRESSLY declined to decide 'what effect, if any, recovery of repair costs should have on a claim for a vehicle's loss in value'; i.e., whether diminished value survives an adequate repair remains explicitly open even in Hawaii's own leading case. (Richards was a claim against a repair shop for negligent repair work, not against an at-fault driver, so its extension to an ordinary third-party auto-accident tort claim is by analogy only.) A 2022 Boston University Law Review 50-state survey independently places Hawaii among 16 states with no clear leading case or statute on this point. | 2 yearsHaw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7 |
| Iowa | Recognized Iowa recognizes diminution in market value as a recoverable element of vehicle damages when repair cannot fully restore pre-accident value; well-settled rule from Papenheim v. Lovell, applied to a post-repair claim in Hawkeye Motors, Inc. v. McDowell Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Iowa 1982); reaffirmed in Papenheim v. Lovell, 530 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Iowa 1995); applied in Hawkeye Motors, Inc. v. McDowell, 541 N.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) | 5 yearsIowa Code § 614.1(4) |
| Idaho | Unsettled no Idaho appellate decision addresses recovery of diminished value for a repaired vehicle in a third-party tort claim | 3 yearsIdaho Code § 5-218(3) |
| Illinois | Recognized Trailmobile Division of Pullman, Inc. v. Higgs, 12 Ill. App. 3d 323, 297 N.E.2d 598, 600 (5th Dist. 1973): "If the property is worth less after it is repaired than its value before the injury, the measure of damages is the difference in the market value before the injury and in its repaired condition in addition to the reasonable cost of repairs." (damaged trailer/vehicle, tort claim). | 5 years735 ILCS 5/13-205 |
| Indiana | Recognized Shield Global Partners-G1, LLC v. Forster (Ind. Ct. App., Feb. 19, 2020, No. 19A-CC-1100) (reversing trial court; residual/inherent diminished value recoverable in negligence action even though vehicle was fully repaired), applying Wiese-GMC, Inc. v. Wells, 626 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (three-part fair-market-value-reduction rule). | 2 yearsInd. Code § 34-11-2-4(a)(2) |
| Kansas | Recognized Ohlmeier v. Jones, 51 Kan. App. 2d 1014, 360 P.3d 447 (2015) (affirming $4,185 diminished-value judgment against at-fault driver); Venable v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., 214 Kan. 43, 519 P.2d 667, 672 (1974) (measure of damages where repair fails to restore the vehicle is value-before minus value-after-repair, plus reasonable repair cost). | 2 yearsK.S.A. 60-513(a)(2) |
| Kentucky | Recognized Conrad v. Shrout, No. 2017-CA-000862-MR, 2018 WL 3814610 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2018) (affirming that residual diminished value is recoverable against an at-fault driver, capped by the "gross diminution in value"), applying the property-damage measure articulated in Muncie v. Wiesemann, 548 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Ky. 2018). | 2 yearsKRS 413.125 |
| Louisiana | Recognized Orillac v. Solomon, 33,701 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 765 So.2d 1185, 1188-89 ("additional depreciation damages may be recovered for diminution in value attributable to the vehicle's involvement in the accident"); accord Davies v. Automotive Cas. Ins., 26,112 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 419, 422; Romeo, Inc. v. Broussard, 528 So.2d 231, 234 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 356 (La. 1988). This line of authority is expressly collected in a footnote of Johnson v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co. (La. App. 1 Cir. 2001): "Our state courts have recognized that insurers may be held liable for third party diminished value claims." Read the Orillac opinion text directly at https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/la-court-of-appeal/1285802.html. | 2 yearsLa. Civ. Code art. 3493.1 (enacted by Acts 2024, No. 423, §1, eff. July 1, 2024; replaces former 1-year period under repealed art. 3492) |
| Massachusetts | Recognized McGilloway v. Safety Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 209, 174 N.E.3d 1191 (2021) (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court -- the state's highest court). Full text at https://casetext.com/case/mcgilloway-v-safety-ins-co. | 3 yearsMass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A |
| Maryland | Recognized Fred Frederick Motors, Inc. v. Krause, 12 Md. App. 62, 277 A.2d 464 (1971) (Md. Court of Special Appeals), building on Taylor v. King, 241 Md. 50, 213 A.2d 504 (1965) (Md. Court of Appeals, MD's then-highest court); reaffirmed in Kruvant v. Dickerman, 18 Md. App. 1, 305 A.2d 227 (1973). Directly confirmed by the Maryland Insurance Administration itself: 'Maryland case law recognizes the diminution of a vehicle's value as a valid and compensable element of damages.' | 3 yearsMd. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 |
| Maine | Recognized Collins v. Kelley, 133 Me. 410, 179 A. 65 (1935) (Maine Supreme Judicial Court / "Law Court"), establishing that vehicle-damage recovery is measured by the before/after value difference and that repair cost is not conclusive; confirmed as still-governing law by the Maine Bureau of Insurance's own consumer guidance. Full case text at https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/collins-v-kelley-889328695. | 6 years14 M.R.S. § 752 (general civil-action catch-all; Maine has no separate, shorter statute for tort/property-damage claims) |
| Michigan | Unsettled no Michigan appellate decision has squarely held whether diminished value falls within the recoverable 'damages...to a motor vehicle' under the no-fault mini-tort statute (MCL 500.3135(3)(e)); a 2020 Court of Appeals case seeking a declaratory ruling on exactly that question was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds (wrong court) without reaching the merits, so insurers' position that DV is not covered by the mini-tort has never been appellately tested. MCL 500.3135(3)(e); Shield Global Partners – GI LLC v Progressive Casualty Ins Co, No. 347948 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2020) (unpublished) | 3 yearsMCL 600.5805(2) |
| Minnesota | Unsettled Minnesota's no-fault tort threshold restricts only bodily-injury/noneconomic-detriment claims, so a vehicle property-damage claim against an at-fault driver proceeds as an ordinary common-law negligence action, unrestricted by any mini-tort-style cap. Minnesota's general measure-of-damages rule for injured (non-destroyed) property — cost of repair plus any remaining diminution in value, capped at total diminution — has been applied by Minnesota appellate courts to real property (e.g., a house), but no reported Minnesota appellate decision has applied it to a repaired motor vehicle specifically, so whether a court would recognize residual diminished value as an element of vehicle damages remains untested at the appellate level. In re Commodore Hotel Fire & Explosion Cases, 324 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 1982); accord Chabot v. City of Sauk Rapids, 412 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); cf. Minn. Stat. § 65B.51 (no-fault threshold limited to noneconomic detriment from bodily injury) | 6 yearsMinn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(4) |
| Missouri | Recognized Winter v. Elder, 492 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Rook v. John F. Oliver Trucking Co., 556 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) | 5 yearsMo. Rev. Stat. (RSMo) § 516.120(4) |
| Mississippi | Recognized Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 213 Miss. 520, 57 So. 2d 158 (1952); Ishee v. Dukes Ford Co., 380 So. 2d 760 (Miss. 1980) | 3 yearsMiss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) |
| Montana | Unsettled | 2 yearsMont. Code Ann. § 27-2-207 |
| North Carolina | Unsettled the North Carolina Court of Appeals has addressed diminution-in-value damages for a wrecked, repaired vehicle in one published case, but resolved it on standing/evidence grounds (a lessee, not the owner, sought the diminution) rather than squarely holding that diminished value is a recoverable element of tort damages against an at-fault driver; the court merely assumed such a claim could exist without deciding the underlying legal question. Mauney v. Carroll, 251 N.C. App. 177, 795 S.E.2d 239 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) | 3 yearsN.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(4) |
| North Dakota | Recognized Sullivan v. Pulkrabek, 2000 ND 107, 611 N.W.2d 162 (N.D. Supreme Court, 25.05.2000) | 6 yearsN.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(4) |
| Nebraska | Unsettled Wylie v. Czapla, 168 Neb. 646, 97 N.W.2d 255 (1959) | 4 yearsNeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 |
| New Hampshire | Recognized Copadis v. Haymond, 94 N.H. 103, 47 A.2d 120 (1946); bestätigt in Couture v. Marquis, 108 N.H. 47 (N.H. 1966) | 3 yearsN.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (RSA) § 508:4, I |
| New Jersey | Unsettled no published New Jersey appellate decision squarely applies diminished-value doctrine to a repaired motor vehicle in a third-party negligence claim; the closest authority is general tort dicta on the diminution-in-value damages measure. 525 Main Street Corp. v. Eagle Roofing Co., 34 N.J. 251, 254-255 (1961) (discussing Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 147 (1950)) | 6 yearsN.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 |
| New Mexico | Unsettled | 4 yearsNMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 |
| Nevada | Unsettled no published Nevada appellate decision squarely applies diminished-value doctrine to a repaired motor vehicle in a third-party tort claim; the closest authority is a non-vehicle commercial-property case adopting diminution-in-value as the measure of damages where repair would be economically wasteful. Mort Wallin of Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Commercial Cabinet Co., 105 Nev. 855, 857 (1989) | 3 yearsNRS 11.190(3)(c) |
| New York | Unsettled Franklin Corp. v. Prahler, 91 A.D.3d 49, 932 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div., 4th Dep't, 10.11.2011) | 3 yearsCPLR § 214(4) |
| Ohio | Recognized | 2 yearsOhio Rev. Code § 2305.10 |
| Oklahoma | Recognized Brennen v. Aston, 2003 OK 91, 84 P.3d 99 (Okla. 2003); Oklahoma Supreme Court held the proper measure of damages to personal property (a vehicle, in a tort suit against the at-fault driver) includes both the cost of repairs AND the post-repair diminution in value; codified in Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction (OUJI) 4.14.3. | 2 yearsOkla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) |
| Oregon | Recognized Mock v. Terry, 251 Or. 511, 446 P.2d 514 (Or. 1968); Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed the general Oregon tort rule for damaged personal property: the measure of damages is the difference between value immediately before and immediately after the injury. See also EAM Advertising Agency v. Helies, 954 P.2d 812 (Or. App. 1998), which recognized the diminished-value theory against the party who caused the damage but rejected that particular claim for insufficient evidence (not as a categorical bar). | 6 yearsORS 12.080(4) |
| Pennsylvania | Recognized Holt v. Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 54 A.2d 89 (Pa. Super. 1947); a car-collision trespass action against the at-fault driver; the court adopted Restatement of Torts § 928 as Pennsylvania law: damages include the before/after value difference OR, at plaintiff's election, cost of repair with due allowance for any remaining difference between original value and post-repair value, plus loss of use. | 2 years42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(3) |
| Rhode Island | Unsettled no Rhode Island Supreme Court decision squarely applies diminished-value doctrine to a repaired motor vehicle in a third-party negligence claim. The Supreme Court has recognized 'diminished value' of a vehicle as a provable damages category, but only in a breach-of-warranty case against the manufacturer, not a negligence/tort claim. A 2009 DBR administrative licensing decision (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dean Auto Body, DBR No. 07-I-0180) discusses unproven diminution-in-value, but only as an element of the vehicle owner's OWN carrier's (Allstate's) first-party payment obligation -- the true third-party claim against the at-fault driver's insurer (Greenwich) was denied and dropped from the case before that discussion. That decision therefore provides no support at all for a third-party (at-fault-driver's-insurer) DV obligation. Oberlander v. General Motors Corp., 798 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I. 2002) | 10 yearsR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) |
| South Carolina | Recognized Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (S.C. 1955); South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a jury award of the difference between a vehicle's fair market value before and after a collision, holding that repair-cost estimates alone do not cap recovery when repairs would not fully restore the car's value. | 3 yearsS.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(4) |
| South Dakota | Recognized South Dakota Division of Insurance, Bulletin 03-02 (Dec. 11, 2003); official state insurance-regulator guidance confirming the third-party diminished-value obligation is unaffected by SD case law barring first-party DV. No SD appellate case is squarely on point for a vehicle-specific third-party claim, but general property-tort doctrine (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 928) applies and is unchallenged by any SD statute. | 6 yearsSDCL § 15-2-13 |
| Tennessee | Recognized Grimes v. Hancock, No. M2011-01940-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2012) (at-fault driver's liability carrier; damages for injury to personal property in an accident-caused tort are measured by either repair cost OR the before/after fair-market-value difference, citing GEICO v. Bloodworth, 2007 WL 1966022 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), and Tire Shredders, Inc. v. ERM-North Central, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) | 3 yearsTenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(1) |
| Texas | Recognized Tex. Dep't of Ins. Bulletin No. B-0027-00 (Apr. 6, 2000), quoted with approval by the Texas Supreme Court in Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 158 n.5 (Tex. 2003); accord American Standard County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barbee, 258 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1953, no writ) (tort measure of damages for a wrecked-and-repaired vehicle is the before/after market-value difference) | 2 yearsTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) |
| Utah | Recognized Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 P. 676 (1920); reaffirmed in Hill v. Varner, 3 Utah 2d 434, 290 P.2d 448 (1955) and Sevy v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 9 Utah 2d 141, 334 P.2d 554 (1959) | 4 yearsUtah Code § 78B-2-305(2)(b) (cross-referencing § 78B-2-307(3)); special motor-vehicle-accident carve-out; the general personal-property SOL under § 78B-2-305(2) is 3 years |
| Virginia | Recognized Averett v. Shircliff, 218 Va. 202, 237 S.E.2d 92 (1977) (Va. Supreme Court); Va. Code § 46.2-1600 (statutory definition confirming diminished value compensation runs from an insurer to a 'third party vehicle owner') | 5 yearsVa. Code § 8.01-243(A) |
| Vermont | Recognized Kinney v. Cloutier, 125 Vt. 109, 211 A.2d 246 (1965), applying Purington v. Newton, 114 Vt. 490, 49 A.2d 98 (1946) | 3 years12 V.S.A. § 512(5) |
| Washington | Recognized Grothe v. Kushnivich, 521 P.3d 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022) | 3 yearsRCW 4.16.080 |
| Wisconsin | Recognized Hellenbrand v. Hilliard, 2004 WI App 151, 275 Wis. 2d 741, 687 N.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 2004) | 3 yearsWis. Stat. § 893.52(2) |
| West Virginia | Recognized Ellis v. King, 184 W. Va. 227, 400 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 1990) | 2 yearsW. Va. Code § 55-2-12 |
| Wyoming | Recognized Meredith GMC, Inc. v. Garner, 78 Wyo. 396, 328 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1958), reaffirmed in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Langdon, 624 P.2d 240 (Wyo. 1981) | 4 yearsWyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv) |
Court citations and statutes verified state by state. The deadline runs from the date of the crash, not from the day the insurer denies you.
How the Claim Actually Runs
- 1
The crash — and the clock starts
The limitation period runs from the date of the collision, not from the day the insurer says no. In 17 states that is two years or less. Note the date.
- 2
Repairs are completed
Keep the full repair invoice, the photographs and the estimate. The claim is about what the repair could not restore, so the record of what was repaired is the foundation of it.
- 3
An appraisal establishes the gap
An independent appraisal compares the pre-loss market value against the post-repair value of the same vehicle with an accident on its record. Without it there is a grievance but no measurable number, and the adjuster will supply one of their own.
- 4
The demand goes to the correct insurer
This is where the table matters. Sent to the at-fault driver's carrier in a state that recognises the claim, it stands on settled law. Sent to your own carrier in one of the 17 states that reject it, the denial is correct and no amount of escalation changes it.
- 5
Negotiation — or suit before the deadline
Most of these claims settle. The ones that fail usually fail for the same reason: the negotiation outlived the limitation period. If the deadline in your state is close, the decision to file has to be made before the deadline, not after the next adjuster call.
Three Claims You Will Hear That Are Not True
Diminished value supports a busy paid ecosystem of appraisers, demand-letter kits and recovery services. These three assertions turn up constantly and none of them survives contact with the state rules.
"Every state pays diminished value"
For the third-party claim it is close to true — 37 of 51. For your own collision policy it is plainly false: 17 states hold the policy owes repair or replacement and nothing more, and only 6 clearly allow it. Alabama's Pritchett and Florida's Siegle say so in as many words.
"The 17c formula is what you are owed"
17c is an insurer's internal worksheet: cap the loss at 10 % of book value, then cut it for damage severity and again for mileage. It routinely produces a number far below the market difference an appraiser measures. It binds nobody; in most of these states the legal measure is value before minus value after.
"A perfect repair means no claim"
The opposite is the premise. The claim exists precisely because a properly repaired car still carries a reported accident on its history and sells for less. That is why the third-party claim survives a flawless repair — and, in the states that reject the first-party claim, exactly why they reject it: they treat a first-rate repair as the whole of what the policy promised.
Questions People Actually Ask
What is a diminished value claim?
It is a claim for the resale value your vehicle lost by being in a crash, over and above the cost of repairing it. Two identical cars, one with a reported accident on its history, do not sell for the same money — that difference is the claim.
Can I claim it from my own insurance company?
In most states, no. 17 jurisdictions hold that a standard collision policy promises repair or replacement and nothing further; only 6 clearly allow the claim against your own insurer, Georgia being the leading example after State Farm v. Mabry. Switch the table to the first-party view to see where your state falls.
How long do I have to file?
Between 2 and 10 years depending on the state, running from the date of the crash. 17 states allow two years or less. Every row in the table shows its own deadline and the statute it comes from.
How much is a diminished value claim worth?
It depends on the vehicle, not on a formula. The gap is largest for newer, low-mileage cars with structural damage, and can be negligible for an older vehicle with cosmetic damage. An appraisal measuring pre-loss against post-repair market value is what establishes it; the insurer's 17c worksheet is a negotiating position, not a valuation.
Does it matter that the repair was done perfectly?
For the third-party claim, no — that is the whole point of it. For the first-party claim in states like Florida and Alabama it matters completely: those courts hold that an adequate repair discharges everything the policy promised.
What if I was partly at fault?
Comparative-fault rules apply to a diminished-value claim as they do to any other property damage claim, so a share of fault reduces or, in a few states, bars the recovery. If the crash was entirely yours, the third-party route is closed and you are left with whatever your own policy allows in your state.
Do I need a lawyer for this?
Many diminished-value claims are settled directly with an appraisal and a demand letter. A lawyer becomes worth the cost where the loss is large, where fault is disputed, or where the state is one of the unsettled ones — there the outcome depends on how the claim is framed rather than on a rule you can look up.
Separate from this case: were you injured in the last 2 years?
Class-action payouts are fixed amounts through an administrator. A personal injury claim is a different case — and often worth far more. Free estimate, no obligation.